Publisher's Synopsis
The contemporary operating environment poses distinctly different challenges for military commanders and planners than traditional conflicts. Non-contiguous battlespace exposes lines of communication to enemy action, unlike the linear battlespace that much of current doctrine has been based upon. As convoys continue to face improvised roadside bombs and other insurgent attacks, ground commanders are committing additional combat forces to protect these lines of communication. One tool available to free combat power for its primary role is to use airdrop to circumvent the dangerous roadways. This methodology has borne fruit in Afghanistan, but it is curiously not employed by Army units in Iraq. Is airdrop suitable for use in Iraq? A brief review of three historical airdrop cases helps identify parameters for employment of airdrop. Common lessons learned from Dien Bien Phu, Khe Sanh and Operation Enduring Freedom denote how and why airdrop succeeds or fails when commanders intentionally place forces into isolated battlespace. A critical evaluation of the accuracy, efficiency, complexity and responsiveness of airdrop--as opposed to ground convoy--further delineates when airdrop is suitable and when it is not. A class of supply analysis also evaluates whether airdrop can provide sufficient support to an example field artillery battalion in Iraq. Unfortunately, current doctrine, organizational structure and unit training is insufficient to maximize the potential of airdrop. Suggestions for improvement are identified, most importantly the need for a streamlined request procedure in joint doctrine and a planned airlift apportionment for airdrop, as well as incorporation of airdrop into the Army's combat training centers.
