Publisher's Synopsis
As of July 2004, there have been over 31,900 reserve Marines activated in support of the GWOT, the highest total since the Korean War. Yet with the current active duty operations tempo equating to a greater then one-to-one ratio, the Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadrons remain the only Reserve capability not to have been activated. In light of the Department of Defense's push for transformation, and in the simple fact that not a single Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadron has been used in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom, the following question must be asked: Are the Marine Reserve F/A-18 squadrons relevant? If they are relevant, then why, to date, have these Reserve squadrons not been used in the GWOT? If these squadrons are not relevant, then what should the Marine Corps do with them? In providing the answers to the above questions, this research concludes that the Reserve F/A-18 squadrons are in fact relevant. Subsequently, five courses of action are offered as recommendations for the Marine Corps leadership, which if implemented, will significantly improve the use of these assets. In fact, in January 2005, at about the time the first draft of this paper was to be completed, Headquarters Marine Corps made the decision to activate VMFA-142 for use in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Coincidently, in making better use of the Reserve F/A-18 squadrons, Marine Leadership implemented this papers recommended course-of-action. Sometime in March of 2005 this squadron will deploy as the first Marine Reserve TacAir squadron to support a contingency operation since the Korean War. Although I would like to believe the inquiries I made to Headquarters Marine Corps played a part in this decision, the reality is I doubt that they did. Even so, this paper provides a long-term look at the personnel problems posed by the Global War on Terror and offers some solutions to help mitigate their impact. I would like to take the opportunity to thank those who were instrumental in enabling me to complete this research project. First and foremost is my wife and children; their patience and support were unwavering. I must also thank my two Marine Corps Command and Staff faculty advisors, Colonel "Nut-z" Niblock (USMC) and Dr. John Gordon, for their tutelage, guidance, and editing as I proceeded throughout this project. Finally, I would like to thank all the senior Marine Corps leaders who granted me interviews. They helped me to better understand the issues involved with my topic: LtGen Amos, MGen Bergman, MGen Ghormely, BGen Post, Col Brady, Col Blalock, Col Hawkins, Col Morey, LtCol Hitchcock, and Maj Roach, each of whom dedicated time from their busy schedules to answer my questions. I will be forever grateful.
