Publisher's Synopsis
Scientific Study from the year 2024 in the subject Politics - Political systems in general and in comparison, University of Veracruz (IIESES), language: English, abstract: This article critically examines Mexico's 2024 judicial reform, which introduced the principle of non-contestability (inimpugnabilidad) for constitutional amendments, effectively removing judicial oversight from these amendments. Drawing on comparisons with judicial review frameworks in Germany, India, and the United States, the study reveals the significant risks posed to Mexico's legal coherence, human rights protections, and democratic accountability under this reform. Using formal logic, set theory, and game theory, it models the potential conflicts and incoherences that arise from an unchecked constitutional amendment process. The study argues that non-contestability enables amendments that might contradict Mexico's constitutional principles to stand without a corrective mechanism, raising critical questions about the balance of power and the protection of fundamental rights. Solutions such as establishing a limited judicial review or an independent constitutional review council are proposed to prevent legal inconsistencies and protect democratic principles.
