The Nature and Value of Talent

Talents play a central role in the way that we live our lives, and it is widely

assumed that identifying and developing one's talents is valuable, both for oneself

and for others. Despite this, the philosophical literature is seriously lacking in its

discussion of the nature and value of talent; the objective goodness of talent and

its development is often assumed without an analysis of what a talent is, and the

value that we place on it. This dissertation aims to provide such an analysis,

offering a philosophical account of the nature and value of talent, and an account

of why we value its development. In doing so, I demonstrate how this can inform

and help us assess the debates and arguments that are made in the existing

philosophical literature on talent. I do not aim to provide an exhaustive overview

of all the philosophical issues that could be raised in relation to the value of talent

and talent development, but instead I focus on three central issues that arise when

analysing the nature of talents and the role that they play in our lives.

The first issue is the nature of talent itself. Here I offer an account of

talent, understood as a high level of potential for a particular skill which is

expressed and manifested in the excellent acquisition of that skill. The second

issue is whether or not we have good prudential reasons or a moral obligation to

develop our talents. I begin by objecting to Kant's claim that there is a moral duty

to develop one's talents; I will argue that if there is such a duty, it will not be

generated by the commitments of Kant's moral theory. I then argue that whether

or not talent development is morally required, or prudentially good, is conditional

on one's endorsement of the commitments that are required to bring about the

development of one's talent.