Publisher's Synopsis
It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language,
personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least
serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely
philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics
etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein
and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative linguistic System 2 and
unconscious automated prelinguistic System 1 actions or reflexes.
I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of two of the most eminent students
of behavior of modern times, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, on the logical structure
of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein's
fundamental discovery -that all truly 'philosophical' problems are the same-confusions
about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same-looking
at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions
of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem is that one can say anything but one
cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a
very specific context. I analyze various writings by and about them from the modern
perspective of the two systems of thought (popularized as 'thinking fast, thinking slow'),
employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. I show that
this is a powerful heuristic for describing behavior.
