Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1892 edition. Excerpt: ...at Quatre Bras does not in any way justify Napoleon's delay in marching upon the English. The propriety of this step was not dependent on the accounts to be received from Marshal Ney. To unite the reserves to the left wing and move upon Wellington at the earliest possible moment was the thing to do, whatever might be the reports from Ney. Marshal Soult seems to have been of no assistance to the Emperor on this morning. If he had been a competent and efficient chief-of-staff he would assuredly have had all needed information ready for the Emperor when the latter made his appearance in the morning. As it was, knowing nothing of what had happened at Quatre Bras till nearly eight o'clock, waiting till it should suit Ney to furnish him with the information requested in the 8 A. M. despatch, assuming that Wellington must have heard of the defeat of Bliicher and fallen back in consequence, the Emperor amused himself with going over the field of battle, and talking politics to the generals.9 He did not exert himself in the least to stimulate the energy La Tour d'Auvergne, p. 214. See also, pp. 208 and 233. and activity of his subordinates; in fact, he yielded to that lassitude which is so apt to succeed unusual exertion. He deliberately postponed the execution of the next step in his campaign, notwithstanding that the inComplete result of his encounter with the Prussians rendered it all the more imperative that no time should be lost and no opportunity neglected. During the forenoon, however, the troops intended to join Ney were ordered to Marbais on the turnpike, --Lobau' at ten o'clock, --the Guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers at eleven. At noon, it having been reported that the English were still at Quatre Bras, another order" was sent...
