Publisher's Synopsis
The COSSAC planners in 1943 outlined a strategy to capture the city of Caen, some 10 miles in-land from the coastline with an airborne division. On assumption of command of 21st Army Group, General Montgomery up-scaled the invasion and inserting SWORD Beach, gave the task of capturing the city to the 3rd Division on D Day or shortly afterwards. The Germans, however, seeing the number of Allied divisions, many fictional, multiplying on their situation maps, believed that a secondary landing would be made in Normandy. In April 1944, they therefore made significant reinforcements including moving the 21st Panzer Division to the important transport node of Caen that, if held, barred the way onto the more open country south to Falaise. Though aware of the German reinforcement thanks to ULTRA, the Allied aspiration remained to capture Caen and fix the Germans against the British Second Army on the eastern flank of the lodgement. In doing so, it became obvious that the city would not be captured as quickly or cleanly as originally envisaged. On D Day, the 3rd Division faced not just the coastal crust of defences, but German formations deployed in depth, including the 21st Panzer Division barring the way to Caen. Beset with difficulties resulting from Eisenhower's decision to 'go' in less-than-ideal conditions, the landing was slow and the division could not develop the necessary momentum to carry them to the city.
