Publisher's Synopsis
On 5 November 2002, an armed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operated Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) launched a lethal missile strike, killing Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, a high ranking al-Qaeda member and suspected architect of the USS Cole bombing, in an isolated and sparsely populated region within Yemen. This missile strike appears to have initiated a new and highly controversial phase in the Global War on Terror; moving "the Bush administration away from the law enforcement-based tactics of arrests and detentions of al-Qaeda suspects that it had employed outside Afghanistan in the months since the fighting there had ended." Since the 2002 Yemen strike US officials have acknowledged "at least 19 occasions since September 11th on which Predators have successfully fired Hellfire missiles on terrorist suspects overseas." While it is uncertain how many unacknowledged strikes the US has conducted, "now that al-Qaeda has decentralized its operations around the globe, it's likely that the war against the network will assume an increasingly covert nature, involving intelligence cooperation and targeted strikes against al-Qaeda suspects rather than major conventional military offensives." This monograph examines the prohibition on assassination embodied within Executive Order 12333 and its effect on a U.S. policy of targeted killing of transnational terrorist leadership. Next this monograph will examine the numerous interpretations of applicable international law regarding terrorism and the states response. This examination will contrast the law enforcement model proposed by adherents of international humanitarian law, with international humanitarian law and the law of war model advocated by those who see the current "war on terror' as an armed conflict between states and trans-national terrorists. Given the level of secrecy and lack of transparency involved in this policy and its implementation, how can we judge the moral and legal implications of the Bush a
