Publisher's Synopsis
Over the past 15 years, the United States has been involved in many irregular conflicts worldwide. The most prominent of these conflicts occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan, where both conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) were deployed on a large scale. As the United States attempted to figure out how to deal with these insurgencies and irregular threats, CF and SOF were often interdependent with one another. These interdependent operations often had tactical success, but strategic gains have proved elusive and it is unclear what effect these actions have had on SOF and their ability to counter irregular threats. Other conflicts, such as Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P), only saw the employment of SOF to counter the irregular threats. This independent operation allowed SOF to remain flexible and bolster the Philippine government through an indirect approach. While interdependence is being applauded by both CF and SOF leaders from experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, this thesis suggests that SOF may gain the greatest strategic utility in irregular wars when operating independently against irregular threats. There has been much discussion about the necessity of conventional forces (CF) and special operations forces (SOF) to be interdependent at the tactical and operational levels to accomplish strategic goals as the United States (U.S.) military begins to adapt to changing threats in the world. Sacolick and Grigsby note that the lack of interdependence "impedes the Army's ability to operationally leverage the unique cultural capabilities of special operations and inculcate them across the conventional force."1 They state that CF/ SOF interdependence will provide a seamless front to the adversaries of the United States. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the impact on SOF strategic utility of interdependence with CFs at the tactical and operational levels. Our research question is: to what extent does CF/SOF interdependence enhance or undermine special operations (SO) effectiveness? The creation of SOCOM in 1987 gave SOF the command and control capability to conduct independent and supported operations. Since the beginning of the GWOT, this capability has been exercised multiple times as well as SOF being the supporting command. The conflicts during the GWOT were the first campaigns, of a long duration, that saw the heavy use of both CFs and SOF operating in the same battlespace. This wide variety of operations during the GWOT, may provide the most relevant cases to examine SOF's strategic utility when interdependent with CFs under the SOCOM structure. The growing demand for CF/SOF interdependence took on great importance as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During Operation Enduring Freedom Afghanistan (OEF-A) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), CFs and SOF operated in the same battlespace. The length of the conflicts (still ongoing in both theaters) also played a role in the relationship between CFs and SOF. CFs and SOF would often train together during pre-mission preparation prior to deployments. Since the demand for more interdependence grew out of these conflicts, the case studies selected will focus on campaigns associated with the GWOT: Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines. The campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan were very visible conflicts that saw the heavy use of both CFs and SOF. The campaign in the Philippines, on the other hand, was less visible to the public. CFs did not participate in Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P) due to force constraints imposed by the Philippine government. All three cases have unique characteristics that will help provide a balanced approach for the analysis.
