Publisher's Synopsis
As operations in Iraq and Afghanistan end, it is useful to analyze the current state of stability operations within the U.S. Army and determine its ability to conduct these types of operations in the future. Analyzing the state of stability operations in the post-Vietnam War era gives us a useful benchmark in analyzing the current state of the Army's ability to conduct stability operations. A study of the de-evolution of stability operations doctrine in the period between the end of the Vietnam War and the beginning of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) provides insight on how prepared the U.S. Army was in conducting stability operations at the beginning of GWOT. The peacekeeping missions of the 1990s also provide insight into the ability of the Army to conduct stability operations, and are helpful to compare the operations of the 1990s with the operations in the first decade of the 2000s. Finally, by analyzing how both operations on the ground and doctrinal changed in GWOT, this monograph provides insight into the adaptability of the Army in executing these types of operations. The important question for future study is the U.S. Army's level of preparedness in conducting stability operations in the future.
