Publisher's Synopsis
The Democratic Members of the Benghazi Select Committee submit this report in honor of the memories of Ambassador Christopher Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty; the other extraordinary heroes in Benghazi and Tripoli who risked life and limb to help their fellow Americans; and the men and women of the Defense Department, State Department, and Intelligence Community who serve the United States every day around the world. We deeply regret that this report is not bipartisan. In May, we asked Chairman Trey Gowdy to work with us on a joint report with conclusions we could all agree on, followed by areas on which we may disagree. We also offered to provide him with a draft of our report in advance. But Chairman Gowdy mocked our request as "mildly amusing." We are issuing our own report today because, after spending more than two years and $7 million in taxpayer funds in one of the longest and most partisan congressional investigations in history, it is long past time for the Select Committee to conclude its work. Despite our repeated requests over the last several months, Republicans have refused to provide us with a draft of their report-or even a basic outline-making it impossible for us to provide input and obvious that we are being shut out of the process until the last possible moment. Our overarching conclusion is that the evidence obtained by the Select Committee confirms the core findings already issued by many previous investigations into the attacks in Benghazi. Although the Select Committee obtained additional details that provide context and granularity, these details do not fundamentally alter the previous conclusions. Section I of our report begins by highlighting the bravery of our first responders on the night of the attacks. U.S. personnel in Benghazi and Tripoli conducted themselves with extraordinary courage and heroism and at grave personal risk to defend and rescue their fellow Americans. Our report provides poignant new details about how their actions saved lives. Our report makes 21 findings based on the evidence we obtained, and it debunks many conspiracy theories about the attacks. In general, the report finds: * The Defense Department could not have done anything differently on the night of the attacks that would have saved the lives of the four brave Americans killed in Benghazi, and although the military's global posture prevented it from responding more quickly that night, improvements were made years ago. * The State Department's security measures in Benghazi were woefully inadequate as a result of decisions made by officials in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, but Secretary Clinton never personally denied any requests for additional security in Benghazi. * The Intelligence Community's assessments evolved after the attacks as more information became available, but they were not influenced by political considerations. * Administration officials did not make intentionally misleading statements about the attacks, but instead relied on information they were provided at the time under fastmoving circumstances.
