Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1911 edition. Excerpt: ... or the spontaneity of knowledge,"1 the faculty of judging,2 the faculty of concepts,3 and the faculty of cognitions generally.4 Reason, again, is variously described as the faculty of judging mediately,5 as the constant condition of all free actions of man,6 as the ground of all concepts, opinions, and assertions,7 as the faculty which organizes and systematizes conceptions,8 as the faculty of deducing the particular from the general,9 and so forth.10 Now, from all this lack of consistency in his terminology, Schopenhauer argues Kant's utter confusion of understanding and reason. This perplexity on Kant's part Schopenhauer finds not difficult to explain, from his own point of view: neither of the two faculties is assigned a definite function, just because Kant failed to recognize their respective spheres of operation. It is in the failure sharply to discriminate between perception and conception that Schopenhauer finds the ground of that "heillosen Vermischung"11 which mars the entire 'Transcendental Logic' How do perception and conception each affect the genesis of the object of experience? Kant's answer lacks all consistency: "through the whole of his theory the utter confusion of the idea of perception with the abstract idea tends towards a something between the two which he expounds as the object of knowledge through the understanding and its categories, and calls this knowledge experience. It is hard to believe that Kant really figured to himself something fully determined and really distinct in this object of the understanding."1 57), and reason the faculty of inference (Kr. d. r. V., pp. 303, 330; M., pp. 246, 268). Now Schopenhauer himself regards judging as a sort of bridge between perception and conception (G., I, pp. 108 ff.;...
