Publisher's Synopsis
In the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom I, the Marine Corps decided to reorganize and re-name the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) to address perceived logistics shortcomings in the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The Combat Service Support Element of the MEF thus became the Logistics Combat Element (LCE), composed of the Marine Logistics Group (MLG), formerly the Force Service Support Group (FSSG). While the new MLG potentially solves problems of unit training, unit cohesion, and lack of established rapport with supported units, reorganization created alarming gaps in the logistics coverage of the MEF. This monograph begins with a brief history of the LCE and analyzes the reorganization effort to determine its risks and benefits. Ultimately, this monograph argues that a rigid adherence to bureaucratic boundaries prevented the Marine Corps from imposing the optimal solution for the logistics structure of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. With alarming gaps in both the coverage of supported units and the distribution network of the MEF, rather than improving logistics support in the MEF, reorganization created additional risks with which the MEF Commander must contend. This monograph identifies those risks and poses a potential solution.
