Publisher's Synopsis
Currently the U.S. Army is intensely appraising its doctrine and methods in view of perceived future wars. The relationship existing between the division G-2 and G-3 has not been examined. Historically peacetime the role of the G-2 and related intelligence resources have been drastically reduced. This capability then had to be redeveloped on a crises basis with less than full effectiveness to join tactical forces in the conflict. The study first examines the history and basis for the coordinating staff principals. Through interviews, current relationships in foreign and U.S. Army staffs and the functional responsibilities of the G-2 and G-3 are examined. Interviews then provide an examination of divisions today and how resources are allocated between the intelligence and operations fields/staffs. The study concludes that a primacy does exist with the operations officer and that resources, specifically personnel, are again being reduced in the intelligence field. History provides a prediction of the impact of this course of action for the next conflict. These reductions in the past have degraded the expertise of the tactical intelligence community to the detriment of the force as a whole. The future war now envisioned precludes the time required for mobilization, training, and fielding these crucial assets. Recommendations are included to reverse this pattern and to provide an intelligence capability that will enable the commander to "see and win the first battle."
