Publisher's Synopsis
EPIC FULL COLOR 8.5" x 11"
The first of three monographs integrated into this book is focused on the future of the US Army as an expeditionary force in a complex world that is rapidly decentralizing while also facing major development challenges. This first monograph seeks to answer five questions at a high level of generality:
01 Is there a Grand Strategy that would provide for both deterrence and defeat of Russia, Iran, North Korea, and China, without the enormous expense and political exposure of a US Army based overseas?
02 Is there a Grand Strategy that would put an end to the proposition that the US Army is the de facto first line of defense for our allies in Europe and Asia?
03 Is there a Grand Strategy that would balance a globally-dispersed Navy and light naval infantry (the Marine Corps) with a home-based heavy (armored) Army capable of both expeditionary and peer warfare, as well as a long-haul Air Force, and a mix of engagement means?
04 Is there a Grand Strategy that would allow the modernization of the Department of Defense (DoD); a reexamination and rebalancing of roles and missions among the five services (inclusive of the US Coast Guard that operates in a virtual state of perpetual war), such that the US Army can rapidly assemble high lethality/low density fighting forces for deployment via air and sea for integration with aerospace and naval precision strike capabilities while also performing most of its own Close Air Support (CAS)?
05 Finally, is there a Grand Strategy that can cultivate Congressional support for change by devising both an Army transformation program as well as a complete make-over of DoD that is home-based and job, as well as, revenue neutral from district to district and state to state?
The second monograph provides an Overview of Planning and Programming Factors for Expeditionary Operations in the Third World. Rooted in the original work of the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA) in 1988-1990, the second monograph responds to US Army interest in being more expeditionary, and itemizes military, civil, and natural-geographic "strategic generalizations" essential to creating an Army that is effective and affordable across the full spectrum of conflict and particularly so in relation to non-permissive environments with sophisticated anti-air and anti-sea weaponry.
The third monograph, building on the combination of a Grand Strategy and Global Reality, first reviews the many thoughtful past recommendations for a future Army, and then develops the concepts and recommendations inherent in the first two monographs to propose an Army that is able to wage peace with a standing peacekeeping brigade that can serve as a hub for multinational, inter-agency stabilization and reconstruction campaigns, and also to wage war with a totally integrated joint reconnaissance and strike construct.
The "fleshing out" of the summary recommendations made in this document occurs in the third monograph - this monograph is by its nature a "broad brush" overview of the possibilities.
