Publisher's Synopsis
What is realism about the external world? A striking aspect of the current debate is the lack of a clear answer to this metaphysical question. The question is commonly conflated with a semantic question about truth. The book sharply distinguishes these questions and argues, from a naturalistic perspective, that the metaphysical one is prior. It advocates a thorough-going realism about the common-sense and scientific physical world. From this basis, it puts forward a correspondence notion of truth, explained in terms of reference, which is in turn explained by a causal theory. It criticizes relativist and constructionist views held by Kuhn and many others (structuralists and post-structuralists). It has detailed criticisms of van Fraassen, Davidson, Rorty, Putnam, Dummett, and others. This new edition has been thoroughly revised and includes a new chapter on Rorty; an expanded discussion on relativism and Kantian constructionism, and truth; and a defence of the role of inference to the best explanation in arguing for realism.
