Publisher's Synopsis
The danger of surface-to-air defenses grows as the nature of US conflicts continues to change. Ground based defenses promise attrition while forcing air forces into standoff range. Furthermore, ground-based defenses cost less and require less training than airborne systems; definite advantages for third world adversaries. Coalition performance in the Gulf War showed future adversaries that they would suffer tremendously by trying to match symmetrically US airpower capability. US strategists should expect enemy systems in the future aimed at causality sensitivity in situations where US vital interests are not at stake. These issues illuminate the need to make defense suppression a planning priority to ensure air superiority. Although air superiority relies on defeating both the air-to-air and surface-to-air defense, this study examines only one element in the quest for air superiority - the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). This study determines how SEAD operational objectives change with the nature and maturity of an air campaign. This research logically flows through three phases to illustrate and categorize SEAD objectives and strategy. First, phase is a historical review of suppression operations significant to US strategy development from W.W.II to the present, focusing on enduring truths that emerge concerning suppression operations. This examination of suppression's role concentrates on how airpower adjusted to the recurring measure-countermeasure struggle. Of particular importance is the evolution of suppression theory and doctrine. Focus of the review is the development of the concepts of opportune, localized, and campaign SEAD. The second phase provides an analysis of ground-based defense employment and functions. Systems based on centralized, semi-autonomous, and autonomous control were analyzed. Identifying highly dependent subsystems offers the potential for inducing cascading effects or significant system disruption. Analysis of these three air defense control methods, shows inherent strengths and weaknesses depending on the nature of control and type of SEAD operations. The third phase is an evaluation of the components of airpower that comprise SEAD capability. This study focuses on the value of knowledge in the conduct of SEAD by examining commander preferences using a value model to understand how the nature of the threat, and the maturity of the air campaign, change the significance of knowledge. Value modeling, or multi-attribute analysis, allows a quantification of preferences by separating them into attributes with defined measures of merit and utility. The value model clearly highlights the elementary factors that facilitate the gathering of information for defense suppression. Motivation for building and evaluating the SEAD model was to lend some insight into the mission's complexity, while complementing the commander's intuitive thinking. The study of SEAD history, air defense systems, and value modeling, is to emphasize to the strategist the nuances of SEAD airpower application throughout the duration of an air campaign.
