Publisher's Synopsis
In 1968, the Federal Court of Justice ruled in the Mephisto case that the bereaved can legally prevent moral impairments to the personality of a deceased relative. This case law has been accepted and continued by the civil courts to this day. Nevertheless, the question of its legal basis remains unanswered. The judge's reasoning leaves much to be desired in terms of stringency and unambiguity, and the opinions on this subject differ widely in the literature. This volume examines the existing justification models and examines them for their compatibility with dogmatics and the foundations of civil law. The result is that there is no basis in post-mortem protection for non-worthy personal rights. Taking into account the constitutional implications, it is then examined how such protection could be codified. It becomes clear that the post-mortem protection of non-worthy personal rights is a public matter, the regulation of which belongs structurally to public law.
