Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1919 edition. Excerpt: ... VI. THE AMEKICAN CEISIS OF 1907.1 The theme I have taken as my text this evening is perhaps too large for the limits of a single lecture. It will hardly be possible within these limits to deal adequately with such a colossal disturbance as the American crisis of 1907. An American professor has described this crisis as "the most extensive and prolonged breakdown of the country's credit mechanism which has occurred since the establishment of the National banking system in 1863"; and another writer styles it "the biggest slump in the history of the human race." The effects have resounded throughout the whole financial and commercial world, which is still suffering serious depression nearly eighteen months after the collapse, and is likely, I fear, to suffer for many months yet. A Banking Crisis. But there is one aspect from which this crisis seems specially interesting and instructive. It is a notable 1 A second lecture to the Institute of Secretaries, delivered on March' 31st, 1909. illustration of the importance of the question of banking reserve, upon which I had the pleasure of addressing you last month. I propose to-night to deal with it mainly from this point of view. Speaking broadly, the crisis of 1907 stands out unique among modern crises, and especially in contrast with European crises, as mainly due, not so much to over-trading, or to general over-speculation, as to defective banking. I maintain that this crisis was emphatically a banking crisis; and I entirely agree with Professor Sprague, who, in concluding an admirable account in the Economic Journal for September, 1908, sums up the moral of the disaster in the words, "Above all, a more intelligent understanding of the purpose of" banking reserves is required." This view has...
