Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1914 edition. Excerpt: ... (e) We can regard the end for which an agent acts either objectively, --finis "obfectivus,"--or formally, --finis "formalis." The former is the objective good itself which the agent wishes to realize, possess or enjoy; the latter is the act whereby the agent formally secures, appropriates, unites himself with, this objective good. Thus, God Himself is the objective happiness (beatitudo objectiva) of man, while man's actual possession of, or union with, God, by knowledge and love, is man's formal happiness (beatitudo formalis). (f) We may distinguish also between the realend (finis" qui" or "cujus," and the personal end (finis "cui"). The former is the good which the agent desires, the good for the sake of which (" cujus " gratia) he acts. The latter is the subject or person to whom he wishes this good, or for whom he wishes to procure it. Thus, a labourer may work to earn a sustenance for himself ox also for his family. The real and the personal end are never willed separately, but always as one concrete good. (g) The distinction between a principal end and an accessory end (motivum "impulsivum ") is obvious. The former can move to act of itself without the latter, but the latter strengthens the influence of the former. A really charitable person, while efficaciously moved to give alms by sympathy with the poor, may not be uninfluenced by vanity to let others know of his charity. {k) Finally we may note the theological distinction between the natural end, and the supernatural end, of man as a rational and moral agent. The former is the end due to man's nature, the latter is an end which is gratuitous and undue to his nature. God might not have created the world or man, and in this sense even the natural end of man is a gratuitous gift of...