Publisher's Synopsis
The evolution of the Strategic Concept, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) blueprint for its approach to the global security environment, has undergone substantial change during the last ten years. These changes reflect the vastly different international world order precipitated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The United States, as a member of NATO, has been equally involved with the developments of the post bi-polar world. It has begun to restructure its military in an attempt to better respond to the full-spectrum of conflict and higher tempo of contemporary operations. The potential for complex multinational operations, coupled with the unique military and strategic dynamics found within such an environment, will ultimately demand a higher level of understanding of such operations from members of the United States Army. Using a contemporary analytical strategy to explore the development of NATO's Strategic Concept, coupled with an examination of Army service specific doctrine, this monograph will answer the problem statement of this research: Is the United States Army aware of the operational ramifications contained within NATO's new strategic concept? The most visible evidence of alliance understanding and awareness rests within the cornerstone publications and service doctrine. This monograph concludes that there is insufficient attention paid to alliance and multinational operations within its doctrine and manuals and points to After Action Reviews from Kosovo and Bosnia to support these findings. The extensive experience accumulated by U.S. Army commanders since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords must be cultivated and ultimately integrated into future doctrine development.
