Publisher's Synopsis
This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1841 edition. Excerpt: ... General Le Merchant's brigade, against which it was chiefly directed, lost a few horses. The only hostile demonstration in return on the part of the British, was confined to some skirmishing by the light cavalry on the plain. The day closed under the general expectation of a fierce conflict on the morrow. On the 21st the troops were under arms at daybreak, and they saw the enemy below them equally prepared. The order to engage was awaited with impatience; and as the hours passed without its coming, murmurs were very distinctly heard through the line at such an opportunity of crushing the enemy being allowed to escape. Ensign Le Marchant, in writing on the subject afterwards to his brother, observes," If we had at"tacked the enemy, we must have annihilated "him; we were so greatly his superior in num"bers." All this ardour was destined to be disappointed. The sun set in peace as on the day before--Lord Wellington was immovable. Some military critics, especially the author of "Annals of the Peninsular War," have blamed Lord Wellington for not fighting on this occasion. On the other hand, it is believed by many of equally high authority that Lord Wellington decided rightly. A general action was not what he wanted. The capture of the forts of Salamanca was his primary object, and of this he was secure if he maintained his position. A battle could not be fought without quitting his position, and without losing such a number of men as would leave him unable even after a victory to cope with the French armies which he knew to be collecting for the purpose of overwhelming him. Marmont had every thing to gain by a battle; Wellington had every thing to lose. During the night of the 21st, the French possessed themselves of an eminence opposite...