Publisher's Synopsis
The view that contradictions cannot be true has been part of accepted philosophical theory since at least the time of Aristotle. In this regard it's almost unique in the history of philosophy. Only in the last forty years has the view been systematically challenged, with the introduction of dialetheism as a solution to certain self-referential paradoxes. With dialetheism, the possibility of true contradictions is a live issue in the philosophy of logic. However, despite the arguments advanced by dialetheists, most logicians and philosophers are still of the opinion that contradictions cannot be true. Rather than advocating the truth of certain contradictions, this thesis offers a different challenge to the classical logician. By showing that it can be philosophically coherent to propose that true contradictions are metaphysically possible, the thesis suggests that the classical logician must do more than she currently has to justify her confidence in the impossibility of true contradictions. Simply fighting off the dialetheist's putative examples of true contradictions in the actual world isn't enough to justify the classical logician's conclusion that true contradictions are impossible. While demonstrating that a competing position is coherent does not in itself challenge the truth of classical logic, it does put a burden on the classical logician to justify her confidence in the impossibility of true contradictions on grounds other than the simple incoherence of true contradictions.
