Publisher's Synopsis
The research focuses on two case studies of 'air transport liberalization' and tests the affect of 'elite' and 'non-elite' air transport interests on the proposal making dynamics of the European Commission. The research tests whether the properties of 'liberal intergovernmentalism,' (domination by 'elite interests' at the national level), are reflected in the behaviour of the Commission when formulating its proposals; this behaviour is defined as neo-liberal intergovernmentalism. The research also tests whether an 'elite accommodation' is necessary within interest groups in order for their positions to successfully affect Commission actions. The research finds that a neo-liberal intergovernmentalism exists when one focuses on the role of DGVII, (the transport directorate), but not DGIV, (the competition directorate). Furthermore, adherence to an elite accommodation within interest groups plays a substantial role in determining the position of DGVII, but not the position of DGIV. The research concludes that elite air transport interests need to adapt to this 'new reality' of Brussels policy making.
