Publisher's Synopsis
This study analyzes the concepts of dominant maneuver and precision engagement at the operational level of war as defined in Joint Vision 2020. The analysis begins by establishing the relationship between today's geostrategic environment, national security trends, and America's limited wars from 1950-2000. Once that relationship is established, the doctrinal concepts contained in Field Manual 3-0, Operations (DRAG Edition) are shown to be synchronized with the Chairman's, Joint Chiefs of Staff, vision for future warfighting contained in Joint Vision 2020. German historian Hans Delbruck's two strategies of warfare: annihilation and exhaustion, and American military theorist Robert Leonhard's concepts of attrition and maneuver are examined to establish the relationship between theory and doctrine. The concept of dislocation is discussed to demonstrate that an enemy can be defeated decisively through the indirect approach of destroying or neutralizing his critical vulnerability. Then, US military operations from Korea, Vietnam and Kosovo are analyzed to demonstrate that the American way of war in the last 50 years was firepower intensive and attrition oriented. A review of US Army doctrine from 1973 2000 revealed that maneuver and firepower remain complementary combat dynamics. This study then recommends a proposed operational maneuver concept relevant to limited wars in the precision engagement era based on the theories of Hans Delbruck and Robert Leonhard. Finally, this study concludes that precision engagement has not advanced to the point where it will be the dominant concept at the operational level in America's future limited wars. It is the author's opinion that dominant maneuver remains the overarching concept at the operational level and that precision engagement remains an enabler.
