Publisher's Synopsis
U.S. military strategy has focused on large conventional wars throughout the history of the United States. Our doctrine and strategy have been focused on large force-on-force operations even when involved in small wars and insurgencies. The requirements and strategies needed to fight a conventional state-on-state war differ greatly from those needed in small wars and counterinsurgency operations. However, throughout our military history we have failed to prepare for small wars and have suffered the consequences for that lack of preparation. Although we have not prepared for these conflicts, we have been involved in several small wars and insurgencies in which we were unprepared initially, but learned many valuable lessons. Yet, upon completion of hostilities, we disposed of what we learned and began focusing again on large conventional warfare. Our current involvement in two counterinsurgencies in the middle-east leads us to once again learn how to fight small wars. The lessons learned by other countries can play a valuable role in our education. France fought a protracted small war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962 from which we can learn valuable lessons. They entered the fight in Algeria after unsuccessfully fighting a long counterinsurgency in Indochina, yet their tactics initially did not reflect their experiences in that conflict. As the battle in Algeria progressed however, France adapted their tactics and fought a tremendously well orchestrated counterinsurgency from which we can learn many valuable lessons. Although the French eventually granted Algeria its independence, the study of their struggle provides insight which the US can and should apply in its own conflicts.
