Publisher's Synopsis
Lessons learned from operations in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past ten years indicate that the Army is fighting in an environment that requires a change in how organizations gather, analyze, synthesize, and produce intelligence. "Top-down" intelligence no longer drives today's operations. Instead, current operations produce numerous lower-level information and intelligence reports that higher headquarters must gather, analyze, and synthesize. The sheer volume of these reports and the depth and breadth of information they provide often exceed the capacity of the intelligence organizations at the various headquarters echelons - particularly those within the brigade combat team (BCT).The particularly high demand for intelligence in today's operational environment, coupled with the need for operational integration of tactical units, leads to the critical question: does the U.S. Army require intelligence support teams at the company level in all BCTs? The methodology consists of a detailed description, analysis, and synthesis of current data collected on intelligence needs and organizational responses to these needs at the company-level throughout the U.S. Army. This research includes case study analysis comparing select brigade combat teams that employed company-level intelligence support teams (CoISTs) with those that did not. A review of historical literature on Army operations reveals a pattern of success among units who had a section of three to eight personnel within the company dedicated exclusively to intelligence analysis. While this research does not indicate a fundamental change in the nature of war, it does highlight the unique requirements for intelligence collection and analysis in today's wars. In particular, close interaction between Army units and local populations has led to the generation of vast amounts of information that platoons and companies both collect and exploit. The lack of a dedicated company-level organization to process this information into actionable intelligence highlights the requirement for a refined intelligence structure, including training requirements, equipping needs, and doctrine for both ongoing counterinsurgency operations and future conflicts. This refinement will improve the effectiveness of Army organizations from the bottom-up, inverting the pyramid to enable tactical units to assess and understand the complex environments in which they operate. In turn, higher echelon units will benefit from this increased understanding at the company level, and the dramatically increased rate at which they can attain that understanding and share it with higher echelons.
