Publisher's Synopsis
The main theme of the study addresses the issue of the arising 'neo' compared to 'traditional' capture paradigms that is tied to players' mobility and the strategic actions of regulators in the open world of finance (as opposed to closed systems which rest on immobile constituents.) The study is formulated on the premise that the mix between the self-interest of global game players under the new paradigm and competition amongst regulators is susceptible to systemic analysis as much as it is subject to meeting recent investor protection goals. Essentially the study attempts to answer three basic questions: - - 1. How and why did international regulatory competition come about during the 1970s-1980s? - 2. What are the major driving forces behind it, and how has it influenced regulatory reforms between two globally competing hegemonic jurisdictions? - 3. What effects have the competition-induced regulatory reforms had on investor protection and systemic stability? - - This book will appeal to academics with regulators and practitioners whose focus is on international, domestic market regulation and the dynamics of institutional frameworks in finance.
