Publisher's Synopsis
Despite the overwhelming edge the US possesses in raw military power over its rivals since the end of the Cold War, regional foes have consistently defied the ultimatums and coercive efforts of the US and its allies. While the US sometimes achieves its national security objectives, it usually does so only after an enormous expenditure of resources. The disconnect between the concepts of traditional coercive theory and reality prompts an obvious question: Is there a more effective way for the US to achieve its national security objectives than direct coercive attempts? To answer this question, this study investigates the concept of indirect coercion. The term refers to the ability to influence third parties such that the third party can modify the original target's behavior in a manner favorable to the United State's objectives. This study explores the mechanics of indirect coercion and provides a detailed classification of various types of third parties in an effort to discover conditions that are conducive to an indirect approach to modifying behavior in the international arena.
