Publisher's Synopsis
This thesis examines the impact of the 1967 flight deck fire on the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CVA 59) and the resulting two investigations, on the development of U.S. Navy damage control doctrine and equipment. The first investigation focused solely on the Forrestal fire; the second assessed the safety of aircraft carrier operations throughout the U.S. Navy. Both investigation reports included several proposals to improve shipboard damage control. The thesis found that most of these recommendations were successfully implemented, substantially enhancing shipboard damage control capability over the long term. Successful implementation of these proposals depended on the following: strong support by, long-term involvement of, and resourcing by the Chief of Naval Operations; as well as broad agreement by senior Navy leaders that the proposed changes were necessary based on lessons learned from the two investigations. Training and material deficiencies appeared to be non-controversial and thus relatively easy to correct; proposals that did not mesh well with Navy culture and existing personnel practices appeared especially controversial and were not successfully implemented.
