Publisher's Synopsis
How can the Army train better at the operational level? This question addresses a lack of training at the operational level that has only become apparent in recent years. One of the reasons for such a shortcoming has been the reluctance of the US Army to acknowledge the operational level of war fighting. Real debate evolved during the 1980's and FM 100-5, Operations, did not list the operational level of war until the 1982 edition. Acknowledging a shortcoming in operational-level training leads to the question; Is the Army's doctrine focused strictly at the tactical level? Tactical training is at the core of the Army's day-to-day existence, and it is not the suggestion of this thesis that any unit should be distracted from this critical focus. This thesis will, however, suggest that operational-level training is deficient in the Army because of a tendency to focus primarily on the tactical fight. Officers are born and raised at the tactical level, and they understand it implicitly by the time they become general officers. However, as general officers they are required to fight at the operational level, despite the fact that they have not been adequately trained to do so. The challenge is for the Army to identify the systemic flaws in its current training doctrine that allow this tendency to continue.
