Publisher's Synopsis
This study is an historical analysis of the principles utilized by Frederick the Great and General Joseph E. Johnston to conduct war at the operational level. To derive these principles selected campaigns of each are examined. For Frederick these are the first three years of the Seven Years War; for Johnston they are the Peninsula Campaign and the Atlanta Campaign of the American Civil War. Having derived the principles employed by each, a comparison of their principles is made. The focus of this comparison is on the different manner in which each approached the conduct of warfare at the operational level. The major contributing factor to this difference is their relative positions within the governments of their respective nations. Frederick, as the King of Prussia, had the absolute authority to establish policy and set strategy. Johnston was forced to conduct his operations within the confines of the strategy established by the Confederacy. The study concludes with a discussion of some of the implications of this comparison for the modern practitioner of the operational art. The most telling of these is that in order to achieve success, the operational commander must be given the means with which to achieve the strategic goals set for him. If these means are not commensurate with the assigned tasks, either the operational goal must be modified or the strategic ends must be changed.
