Publisher's Synopsis
This paper examines congressional concerns regarding the potential ambiguity of a Conventional Strike Missile. It begins by establishing the historical context by examining preceding efforts to develop Prompt Global Strike capability and the genesis of the current development effort using converted Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Next, it provides an examination of the U.S. Congress' ambiguity concern that the use of the Conventional Strike Missile (CSM) could result in a nuclear capable country believing they are under nuclear attack. It then evaluates potential strategies designed to mitigate the ambiguity of a CSM launch. The paper argues that proposed mitigation efforts are largely ineffective in eliminating and in some case could actually increase ambiguity. The paper concludes with a summary of the major findings and conclusions where I argue that the real Congressional concern is the possibility of a retaliatory nuclear attack which is highly unlikely in response to a CSM attack. Finally the paper provides a series of recommendations to address Congressional concerns.
