Publisher's Synopsis
Evolving operations in the twenty-first century suggest a continued value for historical study of previous counterinsurgency operations. Study of such operations tends towards a degree of research into operational theory of security forces against insurgents. Application of counterinsurgency doctrinal guidance requires tailored organizational models for the participating ground forces. An example of an army which developed specific ground force organizational models in support of counterinsurgency is the French Army in the period between 1945 and 1962. This time frame includes the major counterinsurgent wars in Indochina and Algeria. The first facet of study is the French experience and organizational development up to the beginning of the Indochina War, during which many colonial concepts were applied to counterinsurgency operations. Next, a study of French adaptations for the Indochina War and lessons learned from that experience is presented which points out many lessons for counterinsurgency. Finally, the French organizational development in Algeria is studied as the penultimate example of the French model. Derived from previous colonial warfare experience, French organizations adapted to the modern counterinsurgency environment and ultimately could claim a military, if not political, success. Centered on the concept of the territorial organization of a theater, French organizational models for counterinsurgency possess enduring lessons for study and considered emulation.
