Publisher's Synopsis
From 1797 to 1814 the French were governed by Napoleon I; from 1852 to 1870 by his nephew, Napoleon III; from 1940 to 1944 by Marshal Ptain (with Charles de Gaulle as his rival); and from 1958 to 1969 by de Gaulle himself. On each occasion, the coup d'tat which enabled the military man to take power was preceded by a period of progressive, left-wing politics. On each occasion, the military leader was succeeded by a more conventional form of civilian government.;This book examines the paradox whereby the French, the most sophisticated people in Western Europe, have on four occasions been able to solve their political problems only by calling in a military figure. It provides a clear account of the contribution which the four leaders made to the social and political development of France and puts forward a number of possible reasons why French society remained vulnerable for such a long time to military takeovers. It also suggests a number of comparisons with the role played by the military in newly emergent nations. It compares the development of parliamentary democracy in France with what happened in English- speaking countries. It defines the phenomenon of Caesarism as `the assumption of power at a moment of real or alleged national crisis by a figure owing his prestige to genuine or associated military achievements'. Since France now seems to have evolved a workable system of democratic government, this book tells a historical story with a happy ending.
