Publisher's Synopsis
The heart of this book is concerned with the (undergraduate philosophy student) question: 'what constitutes an objectively rationally compelling argument?' Noting and rejecting one esoteric objection, I suggest that a simple answer to this question should be applied to any argument involving different possible permutations of different conceptions of rights, liberty and ethics. Given the empirical evidence that I provide, the main conclusion of this volume is that no well-informed person can rationally vote for either Joe Biden or Donald Trump.Chapter One explores some philosophical influences on Thomas Jefferson with particular reference to Hobbes, Hume and Locke, introducing some important concepts and arguments, which will be further analyzed in following chapters. These concepts / arguments and their analyses will be relevant for the issues of voting rationally / rationally not voting in the 2020 general election and beyond.Chapter Two is first of all concerned with disambiguating two mutually exclusive conceptions of a 'natural right' of the sort referenced in the Declaration Of Independence and reflected in the US Constitution and Bill of Rights. The ramifications of these different conceptions of a natural right are then analyzed with respect to two mutually exclusive conceptions of FreeWill, which are in turn considered with respect to two mutually exclusive conceptions of 'act-centered' ethics (i.e. consequentialist versus non-consequentialist). The core insight of this Volume, revealed in Chapter Two and argued for in Chapter Three, is that if one is concerned with either element of each of the above-mentioned three pairs of mutually exclusive conceptions of natural rights, liberty, and ethics, then a vote for either Biden or Trump would be irrational.
