Publisher's Synopsis
Military dogma and public thought often perceive military operations as a predominantly force on force, combat scenario, despite the historical failures of pure military force in creating lasting, tangible political effects. Modern military theorists have sought innovative modes of planning for campaigns using the latest in technology aimed at affecting enemy behavior. The concept of effects-based operations (EBO) has promised a new era of warfare- warfare that would attack central nodes of enemy capability using a synergistic employment of the national instruments of power (IOPs). In any of the modern literature of EBO, one could easily surmise that only through current levels of technology can militaries use EBO to create desired, lasting effects on enemy and neutral behavior. However, a review of several ancient expeditionary campaigns will reveal the sound use of EBO long before such a term ever existed. This study will provide the context for three ancient campaigns- Alexander the Great's campaign into Persia, Scipio Africanus' campaign against New Carthage, and finally the Roman siege of Jerusalem. The study will answer the following questions: Did the military leadership possess an understanding of the desired end state prior to executing the operations? Did selected ancient expeditionary campaigns utilize synergistic operations across the IOPs? Did ancient generals view their enemy as an inter-related system of systems whereby effects on one system might have indirect effects on other systems? Did ancient generals and planners account for these indirect effects prior to the operation?
