Publisher's Synopsis
In the spring of 1998, the Army Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel requested RAND1s help in determining answers to questions regarding peacetime deployability. In the spring of 1998, the Army Chief of Staff raised several questions about personnel deployability rates with the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel. They requested RAND1s help in determining the answers to these questions and, more generally, in looking at the issue of peacetime deployability. The results shown in this presentation are based on examinations of deployability for Stabilization Forces 4-7, under the Army policies and guidelines for peacetime deployments in effect at that time. RAND research indicates that the wartime non-deployable rate at the installations used for examination purposes was in the 4 percent range, and that it did not change much over time. However, the research discovered that policies regarding deployment during peacetime cause the non-deployable rate to approach 40 percent, according to the peacetime criteria. This would be the rate if the Army undertook business as usual.;In fact, however, the personnel system responds with actions that are intended to lower the non-deployable rate and build up the number of deployable soldiers in the division (or installation) responsible for the operation. This documented briefing also discusses other personnel issues that are affected by such actions.
