Publisher's Synopsis
This monograph is an examination of the transition of the Iraqi Saddam Fedayeen militia into a guerilla organization in an attempt to draw out methods that might be used against the Niruyeh Moghavemat Basij (Mobilisation Resistance Force) militia in the event of a war with Iran. The examination will utilize Dr. Joe Strange's method of identifying the center of gravity and consequent critical vulnerabilities overlaying a System of Systems Analysis (SoSA) framework. By evaluating the critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities of the Saddam Fedayeen along the SoSA political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information construct, and contrasting this framework with Iran and the Basij militia, operational planners can potentially identify successful and unsuccessful patterns and methods to prevent the Basij from transitioning into a guerrilla force. Military means alone will not suffice to isolate the Basij from the people. As larger force embedded throughout Iranian society, the Basij present a much more complex problem than the Saddam Fedayeen. However, the Basij was similar to the Saddam Fedayeen in its participation in repressive acts at the behest of the government and is viewed with caution by many Iranians. It was preparing for guerilla warfare and inculcated successful strategies into its training that were employed in the guerilla war in Iraq, including suicide attacks. There are some similarities along the PMESII spectrum between Iraq and Iran. Both sets of infrastructure were old and in need of repair and modernization. Both regimes strictly controlled the information flow in society. Both regimes knew that a conventional defense against U.S. conventional power is limited and have turned to asymmetrical means of defense, WMD and guerilla war primarily. The primary difference between the Saddam Fedayeen and the Iranian Basij was the ideological commitment of the members of the organization. The Saddam Fedayeen, a
