Publisher's Synopsis
"From 1946 to 1960, the college debated how to develop doctrine for the atomic age. The consensus remained as elusive in 1960 as it did in 1946. Why did the Command and General Staff College leaders struggle to develop doctrine and instruction from 1946 to 1960? Doctrine development and instruction remained nebulous throughout the 1950s because the uncertainty of limited war's feasibility made CGSC commandants hesitant to direct doctrinal changes that disrupted the curriculum. CGSC commandants developed doctrine and instruction cautiously. Only directives from higher headquarters drove significant change. After writing a new atomic-focused curriculum in 1956, CGSC leaders continued to question the feasibility of limited war. The college's challenge was a microcosm of the debate among senior leaders of the US Army. Examining the complex and nebulous nature of doctrine development in the 1950s demonstrates the important connection between
