Publisher's Synopsis
Few insurgencies are resolved by military means alone. Insurgents, by definition, pursue political ends and resolve to accomplish those objectives by means of violence. Today the United States and her Allies are engaged in two distinct Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations, Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of Iraq, US forces are in the process of handing over the remaining responsibility for nationwide security and stability to the Iraqi government. Afghanistan, presently, does not offer such hope. This paper explores the construct of Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration (AR2) through case studies of three conflicts in Peru, Algeria and Iraq. Each case study examines the roots of conflict, the conduct of the conflict by insurgents and counterinsurgents alike and draws inference from the methods of AR2 used to bring about the termination of conflict. The study concludes with Amnesty, Reconciliation and Reintegration is neither a process nor a prescription for peace and stability. There are no formulae that can be applied to a conflict that can resolve it, but AR2 does offer what the application of violence rarely can; the beginnings of a solution.
