Publisher's Synopsis
As the fifth anniversary of "9/11" approaches, our government still has not figured out an efficient and effective system of airline passenger screening. Back during 1969-70, the Federal Aviation Administration''s anti-skyjacking task force developed a viable procedure to screen passengers using a "profile" as step one. This was followed by a "weapons" search with a magnetometer, and concluding with an extensive interview. Following a test at nine airports using one airline, the procedure''s final test was with all airlines at one airport - New Orleans. The conclusion was that the "profile" eliminated at least 98 percent of the flying public! Not only did the American Civil Liberties Union approve of the "profile" because it was not racial, but a New York Federal Court judge rule it did not violate the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. So, why was this proven system abandoned in favor of searching every passenger? The answer is found in two words - bureaucracy and politics. The previous book on this subject, NINE/ELEVEN, detailed why ignoring this sequential procedure could be the primary factor why "9/11" was able to take place. From all available evidence, all 19 terrorists fit enough of that ignored profile to have been detained long enough to miss their flights. Even screening every passenger, most often humiliating many innocent air travelers, has accelerated - but without any proven results. In the prologue to this updated sequel to NINE/ELEVEN, I point out that the method our task force used more than three decades ago should be the one adapted to modern day terrorism. "Airline passenger screening by the Transportation Security Administration n particular, and Mideast terrorism in general, have elements in common. The government should relearn the basic meticulous approaches and conclusions from the original screening program. Mideast terrorists have outsmarted us by switching targets and tactics. (1) Mideast terrorists have easier targets of opportuni
