Publisher's Synopsis
The discussion in current epistemology primarily concerns a lively debate between externalism and internalism. Internalism, broadly speaking, is the view that in order to have knowledge an agent must have access to one's justificatory reasons. Their view is rooted in the classical view of knowledge presented by Plato. For Plato, justification for some belief (the reasons for why the belief is true), one's holding of that belief, and that belief's being true are all necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge.1 Perhaps the primary motivation for most internalists, in regards to their accepting a view which is heavily based on this classical approach, is that the classical approach is meant to distinguish knowledge from mere opinion and lucky guesses. Suppose Ted guesses that his friend Bob is at work but he has no reason for thinking it. And suppose that it just so happens that Bob is at work. Should we say that Ted knew it? Most would say "No." We seem to just recognize that knowledge is something more than true belief. Justification is meant to be the reason/s one has for thinking the given belief is true
